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Abstract 
 
The paper studies the bank’s lending decision, based on three observed phenomena: Banks earn 
substantial profits from off-balance sheet activities and services, which they take into account in 
their lending decisions. Secondly, the critical point in the customer relation is the loan decision: 
the probability of the customer staying with the bank is a function of the loan extended each time 
one is applied for. Third, what is at stake in the loan decision is the expected value of the entire 
customer relation, which is the probability times the present value of expected future profits. The 
bank is a maximizer of this expected present value, while making decisions on individual loan 
applications. It is shown that the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its good customers, 
and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore corner solutions may be 
the rule rather than the exception in the bank’s customer relations, and there is no mechanism 
making the bank indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers. It can be 
optimal to extend loans to (present and expected future) good customers at an interest rate loss. 
A rationed customer with concave enough a probability function can get a bigger loan by asking 
for less. Loyalty increases the customer’s value to the bank but improves its loan terms only if 
the customer makes it conditional on the loan extended. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Rapid technological change and deregulation have caused banks to dramatically refocus their 
activities. With competition depressing margins in lending, the share of non-interest income of 
commercial banks has more than tripled from less than 10 per cent of total income in 1980 to 
over 25 per cent in 1994, (see Rajan (1996)), and bank executives are on record as stating that 
they expect the share of this non-traditional business to rise to 50 per cent by the turn of the 
millennium (Round Table (1996) p. 29). 
  
Following the refocusing, also a new theory of commercial banking is emerging. Its key features, 
from the point of view of this paper, are the following (for excellent surveys, see James and 
Houston (1996) and Rajan (1996); see also Kashyap et al. (2002)). The bank is primarily not in 
the separate businesses of accepting deposits from, and extending loans to its customers, but 
these products constitute the joint business of liquidity provision for the customers: providing 
liquidity on demand by meeting the customer’s liquidity shortfalls by extending loans, and by 
standing ready to pay interest on its excess liquidity. In connection with this and the payment 
processing function the bank obtains plenty of information on the customer, which is a non-rival 
good: the bank can use it over and over again not only for its information-intensive lending 
decisions, but also for other information-intensive products like bank guarantees, standby letters 
of credit, and sale of credit information (see Chan et al. (1986)). Information is thus a joint input, 
which gives the bank a comparative advantage in information-intensive activities, especially if 
the customer demands several kinds of services.  
 
Both the bank and the customer can utilize scope economies with a relationship involving both 
liquidity provision and services1. Possession of information makes the incumbent bank a low-
cost producer for established customers demanding several kinds of services. It also makes the 
bank unable to cost the services separately. In addition, the customer saves search and 
negotiation costs with one-stop banking. 
 
The customer relation is the bank’s main asset, its “crown jewel”. (Round Table (1996) p. 35 and 
Rajan (1996) p. 125). The bank has an implicit contract with its customer, whereby it undertakes 
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to provide the customer liquidity at a “reasonable” price also in adversity. The customer, in turn, 
gives the bank the first right of refusal on all banking business, and as long as the bank’s offer is 
“reasonably competitive”, it will not shop further (Round Table (1996) p. 35). Thus it will not 
even verify the competitiveness of the offer. The bank and the customer view the relationship as 
a whole, involving loans, deposits, and services, though banks have only recently become able to 
monitor individual customer profitability (Round Table (1996) p. 31, 37). It can then be rational 
for the bank to extend loans even on a loss-leader basis in order to get the profits from non-credit 
business (Rajan (1996), p. 117; Round Table (1996), p. 32).2 Correspondingly, banks have been 
found to be reluctant to lend cheaply even to big companies, unless they make a profit out of 
them from other activities (The Economist (1994), p. 83; See also (2004)). 
 
If the bank and the customer view the relationship as a whole, the traditional marginal analysis 
of the loan decision, based on additively separable production and revenue functions, is likely to 
be inappropriate. According to that analysis, the bank equates the marginal cost of funds with the 
marginal revenues, and is indifferent, at the margin, about lending to different customers. Not 
only do bank executives take all the present and future revenues and costs of a relationship into 
account, but they also claim to have profitable and less profitable customers all the time (see 
Round Table (1996)). This being the case, one has a reason to question all the propositions based 
on the traditional analysis.  
 
In an early approach integrating banking services with lending along basically traditional lines, 
Cukierman (1978) postulates that other banking services are priced above their marginal cost 
because of the non-competitive nature of the banking industry, and the bank equates marginal 
cost with marginal revenue, including excess profits from services, in its lending. He specifies 
the demand for services as a function of the loan stock outstanding. In the presence of these 
dependencies, he gets a variant of the conventional marginal conditions and indifference. 
Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) propose that high-quality customers are 
informationally captured by their old bank, which makes it possible for the old bank to earn rents 
on the customer, whereas competition forces the bank to lend to new unknown customers at an 
expected loss. However, as pointed out by Rajan (1992), the bank has an incentive to "behave" 
 5
with its old customers to get in on subsequent projects. Evidence provided by James (1992) on 
investment banks is consistent with this view: the underwriter spread was significantly lower in 
the initial public offerings in which the issuing firm made a subsequent equity offer, and the 
customer was the more likely to switch the poorer the investment banker's prior pricing 
performance (see also Boyd and Prescott (1986), Diamond (1984, 1991), Diamond and Rajan 
(2001), Fama (1985), Flannery (1983), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Osborne and Zaher 
(1992)). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of the “new bank theory” for the loan 
decision, given the information the bank can reasonably be expected to have or at least to form a 
perception of, by focusing on the interplay of three notions, all well supported by empirical 
evidence. First, as suggested above, off-balance sheet activities and banking services like bank 
guarantees, acceptances, foreign exchange operations and trust operations have become quite 
profitable for banks, but they are part of a customer relation and thereby tightly connected to 
their lending function.  
 
Secondly, since the bank’s main asset is the customer relationship, it is appropriate to model the 
optimization with respect to all the expected profits from the customer over the bank’s entire 
planning horizon rather than that of the loan in question over its life. 
 
The third notion is that the entire customer relationship - the capital - is potentially on the line 
each time the customer's loan application is decided on. This was first argued on a theoretical 
level by Kane and Malkiel (1965). On the empirical side, Haines et al. (1991) surveyed small 
Canadian businesses. As summarized in Table 1, they found that 60 % of the firms that got less 
than 50 % of the loan they asked for shopped, while the figure for firms with 50-99 % granted 
was 55 %, and that of firms with 100 % granted 35 %. Of those who shopped 47 % actually 
switched. So if the two sets of percentages are independent, 28 % of the first, and 16 % of the 
last group switched. It is worth noting that the other regressors that came out significant in the 
shopping equation were measures of the quality of the bank's service, and those of the activity 
from the part of other banks in trying to attract the firms' business, but not e.g. commissions, 
spreads, or even deposit or loan rates. Consequently, unlike the pricing of other banking services, 
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each lending decision appears to be potentially critical for the continuation of the relationship, 
the probability of the customer staying being a function of the loan extended, given that applied 
for. 
 
   [Table 1 about here] 
 
This paper incorporates all the profits from the customer relationship in the loan decision, 
highlighting the fact that the whole relationship is at stake each time a loan decision is made. 
Therefore the critical variable is the entire capital of the customer relationship, of which the 
expected service profits can be treated as given for an individual loan decision, since they are 
mainly a function of the nature of the customer’s business. This “customer-specific capital” is 
the expected present value of the future profits from the customer. This expected value is the 
product of the capital and the bank's subjective probability of keeping the customer and the 
capital, and the bank is a maximizer of this expected present value. As shown by Kane and 
Malkiel (1965) and Haines et al.(1991), the probability is a function of the loan extended each 
time one is applied for. Thus the bank is concerned with the entire specific capital but makes 
decisions on individual loan applications. This modelling solution is the novel feature of our 
model, and we feel that it is a more appropriate way to model the loan decision. Of course, this 
approach is not limited to banking but can be applied to firms operating on most customer 
markets. 
 
The subjective probability distribution and the “face value” of customer-specific capital appear 
to provide an explanation for several of the paradoxes that one encounters in the light of the old 
theory. As will be shown, the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its profitable customers, 
and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore corner solutions may be 
the rule rather than the exception in the bank's customer relations. As a result, the bank is 
characteristically not indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers, and there 
is no mechanism bringing about indifference. Thus the best customers can get all the loans on 
preferential terms in all conceivable situations, as is well known to practical bankers. Specific 
capital causes resources to be reallocated towards the bank’s profitable customers' projects (as 
already proposed by Cukierman), though customer profitability is often inversely related to the 
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rate of return on its investments or depends on its production function. It can be optimal to 
extend loans to good customers at an interest rate loss. A rationed customer with concave enough 
a probability function can get a bigger loan by asking for less. It can also be shown that if the 
bank cannot change the loan rate, the customer cannot reach its maximum obtainable loan stock 
in one try, except if the expected revenue function on its loans starts at the origin and is convex 
enough. The intermediate-to-large firm's mobility - through access to other banks and the money 
market - affects its loan terms, unambiguously improving them if the bank cannot change the 
loan rate. The really large firm’s ability to extract a greater share of the rents at the source 
worsens its loan terms. Loyalty, while increasing the customer's value to the bank, improves the 
customer’s loan terms only to the extent that the customer makes it conditional on the loan 
extended. The conventional optimum results in the special case where the non-interest profits on 
each customer are zero and the bank is sure of keeping the customers’ business - or it does not 
care e.g. because of perfectly competitive markets. 
 
Our model nests the theories of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) as building blocks, and there it 
is possible that it is the established good customer who gets all the rents, in contrast to Sharpe. 
 
In the following, the loan decision and other implications for bank lending behavior are studied 
in Part 2, and Part 3 is the conclusion. Appendix 2 studies the case under an interest rate floor (or 
ceiling) constraint e.g. because the interest rate cannot be negative, or a prime rate convention is 
binding. 
 
2. The Capital of a Customer Relationship and Bank Lending Behavior 
 
a. The Model and the Optimum 
 
To focus on the problem on hand, we will assume that the specific capital and the interest 
earnings on loans are independent over customers. We will also treat implicitly the process of 
information collection and its cost (by treating the cost of the bank’s information stock (x) as 
predetermined) and other issues off our focus. This enables us to specify the bank's profit as the 
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sum of the profits from its customers, enabling the bank to examine each customer relationship 
separately. 
  
The basic setting is the following. The bank maximizes its expected net present value by setting 
the loan rate and the loan size ∆L in response to customer i’s given loan request , where 
. Thus if the bank decides to increase the loan rate or extend a smaller loan than the 
customer asked for, it must expect to increase its profit at the expense of the customer. However, 
it also increases the probability that the customer leaves. Such an event would result in the loss 
of all of specific capital. We have: 
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Equation (1) is the expression for the present value of the bank's expected profit. It is the sum of 
the expected profits from the bank’s customers, where (Pi) is the bank’s subjective probability of 
customer (i) staying with the bank, and  the “face value” of the bank's specific capital on the 
customer. The ∆xi is the exogenous marginal cost of the additional information on the customer 
that the bank acquires during the period. Equation (2) spells out the face value. The Zi is the 
capitalized expected non-interest profits generated by the customer, and  is the expected 
iM
Lir
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average risk-adjusted interest earnings on its expected average loan stock (Li) over the bank’s 
planning horizon. The r is the expected average marginal opportunity cost of the loan stock to 
the bank in the future. (Naturally, Z, , and  are unobservable to the outsider, while the 
customer observes .) The expression is spelled out in footnote 3 below. To keep the 
expressions simple, we will treat 
Lr Lrˆ
Lrˆ
r  as exogenous to the loan decision, and Z, x, , and  as 
predetermined - without loss of generality: what matters for the loan decision is the value of 
specific capital, not its source.3 
x∆ 0L
 
In Equation (3) the customer’s expected average loan stock is its initial expected average loan 
stock L0i, plus the share (ai) of the loan extended ( )iL∆  that the bank believes adds to the long-
run average. 
 
In Equation (4), the bank's subjective probability of customer (i) staying with the bank is 
specified, for simplicity, as an increasing function of the difference between the loan extended 
and the loan applied for, and a declining function of the loan rate ( )Lrˆ in excess of the free 
market rate ( r ), given the customer’s idiosynchratic variables, in accordance with the evidence 
presented in the Introduction (See Haines et al. (1991) and Kane and Malkiel (1965)). 
Accordingly, if the entire request is extended (or equals zero), the bank expects to keep the 
customer's business with the maximum probability of 
D
iL∆
1≤iβ : If the bank lends the customer all 
the customer asks for, it cannot make the customer more satisfied so that the probability cannot 
rise above this value. Hence ∂P/∂∆L = 0. Yet β can be smaller than unity, since the bank may not 
expect to keep the customer with certainty. If the application is completely rejected, the 
probability reaches its minimum value of κi ≥ 0: the κ need not be zero, as the bank need not 
expect the customer to leave for sure. Finally, if part of the application is extended and part 
rationed, the probability is between these two values. Thus in the last two cases ∂P/∂∆L is zero 
or positive. The bank observes , but it does not know the critical value of DiL∆ L∆ at which the 
customer moves all or part of its business to another bank. Therefore it bases its optimization on 
a subjective probability distribution. The value of Pi is thus determined by the bank’s evaluation 
of the customer’s propensity to shop and if so, of the offers that the customer is likely to get from 
other banks, as elaborated in Appendix 1, where the P  function is derived from an optimizing 
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model. Of course, while bank investment in new specific capital is a straightforward extension of 
the present analysis, it is beyond the scope of this paper (see Klemperer (1995) and Petersen and 
Rajan (1995)).4,5 
In Equation (5), the bank’s risk-adjusted interest earnings equal the loan rate minus the risk 
premium and administrative costs. The premium is an increasing function of L mainly because, 
all else equal, credit risk is an increasing function of the customer’s leverage. It is a declining 
function of the bank’s stock of information on the customer (xi), because more information 
makes the bank’s subjective probability distribution of the customer’s earnings more compact. 
The includes non-price loan terms such as compensating balances. 
Lr Lrˆ
Lrˆ
 
The P and r~ are assumed to be twice-differentiable monotonic functions of L∆  (the P function 
naturally only in the range between zero and DL∆ ). This differentiability also holds for P as a 
function of . The second derivatives of the Lrˆ P  function have signs opposite to the signs of the 
first derivatives, while 22 /~ Lr ∆∂∂  is positive. 
 
Our formulation accounts for the fact that information is a reusable joint input: the bank needs to 
invest in it when a new customer applies for a loan, but once the information has been acquired, 
it can be used, at a negligible cost, also for subsequent loans, bank guarantees, and other off-
balance sheet activities.2 
 
Finally, Equation (6) states that the loan extended iL∆  is no greater than the request . Of 
course, the parameter values of Equations (2) through (5) are likely to vary over customers. 
D
iL∆
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximum of the bank's expected present value are, 
dropping the subscripts (i): 
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( ) 0;0;0 =∆−∆≥≥∆−∆= LLLL
d
d DD λλλ
π ,      (7c) 
 
where λ is the Lagrangean pertaining to Eq. (6). 
Equations (7a), (7b), and (7c) yield: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,0
ˆ0
2
0 ≤+∂
∂+∆++∆+ λaZ
r
PLaLaPLaLD
L
      (8) 
 
where .
ˆ
~
Lr
P
L
ra
L
PD ∂
∂
∂
∂+∆∂
∂≡  
Thus if inequality holds in Eq. (7c) and rationing is optimal, λ = 0 and equality holds in Eq. (9) 
below, which expresses the optimal loan, given DL∆  and . Correspondingly, if equality holds 
in Eq. (7c), λ is strictly positive, inequality holds in Eq. (9) and we have a corner solution. We 
shall return to Eqs. (8)-(10) shortly. 
0L
 
The critical nature of the loan decision is reflected in an asymmetry in the optimum condition of 
Eq. (7a). It is due to the fact, suggested in the Introduction, that the bank is concerned with the 
entire specific capital but makes decisions on individual loans. In the loan decision, the 
customer's whole business is on the line: The bank weighs the marginal gain in all of specific 
capital, (first term), which greatly depends on the increment to the loan stock, ∆L, against the 
marginal net interest cost of its expected average loan stock (second term), which does not 
include Z and is zero if a = 0. Therefore, the former returns are not the rent flow on specific 
capital over the life of the loan, but the entire capital. Thus its significance, relative to the loan's 
net interest earnings, is greater, the smaller the loan and the shorter its life relative to the bank's 
planning horizon, as can be seen from footnote 3. Correspondingly, the average interest earnings 
from the customer gain importance relative to the marginal interest earnings, as will be 
elaborated in Proposition 1 below. The reason is that the marginal cost and marginal revenue of 
the loan extended ∆L are relevant only to the extent to which they affect the average cost and the 
average revenue of the customer’s expected average loan portfolio during the bank’s planning 
horizon, i.e. if a > 0 and 
Lr
0/~ >∂∂ Lr . In addition, the terms of the loan, but only of the loan in 
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question, affect also the probability of getting both the interest and non-interest earnings during 
the bank’s planning horizon. 
 
It is also seen that the conventional equilibrium results in the special case of P = 1, Z = 0, i.e., the 
non-interest profits on each customer are zero and the bank expects to keep the customer’s 
business with certainty, or it does not care e.g. because of perfectly competitive markets. 
 
The loan decision is illustrated in Figure 1, with L0 +a∆L on the horizontal axis, and R and C, to 
be explained below, on the vertical axis. The two curves in the Figure depict Eq. (8). The  
curve below the horizontal axis is obtained from Eq. (7b). Initially, the customer's expected loan 
stock outstanding is L0, the interest earnings , and the “face value” of specific capital is 
. 
Lr
0Lr
( ) 0L0 LrrZ −+
    [Figure 1 about here] 
When the customer applies for , the expected future rents become contingent on the bank's 
loan decision. The R curve represents the first term of Eq. (8). Its multiplier (D) is the partial 
effect of the net marginal gain, in terms of P, of the loan extended in response to a customer’s 
request: A marginal loan increases P directly (first term of the expression for ). In addition, it 
increases the risk premium (Eq. (5)). To cover this cost, the loan rate has to increase, which 
reduces P (second term of the expression for D).6 The D is thus positive, and a marginal loan 
increases P, if the direct effect on P dominates the effect via the loan rate, and vice versa. Haines 
DL∆
D
et al. find that  was not significant. Partly because of this we will examine the case of a 
positive D to limit the number of cases, while observing that the probability of a negative D 
increases with highly indebted customers with a high 
LrP ˆ/ ∂∂
Lr ∂∂ /~ . (Eq. (5)). (Analysis of this case is 
available from the author.)  
 
As  increases, the value of R increases roughly to the square of ( ) up to the 
quantity applied for ( ), observing that D is also a function of ∆L. At  the customer is 
fully satisfied and cannot be made more so. The bank now expects to keep the customer’s 
business with the maximum probability of β, which implies 
La∆ LaLo ∆+
DL∆ DL∆
0LP/ =∆∂∂  (Eq. (4)). The curve 
then drops vertically, observing that Ld∆  is zero at DL∆  by Eq. (7c). 
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The C curve represents the negative of the remaining terms in the Equation. It intercepts the 
vertical axis at ( )( )[ 0/ˆ/ PLaZrPa L ]++∂∂− λ  and declines linearly down to . It coincides 
with the R curve thereafter because of Eq. (6c), as explained above. The optimal loan is at the 
intercept of the curves at , and we have an interior solution with rationing (the other 
intercept in Figure 1 obviously not applying). The optimal interest earnings  is at the 
projection of on the  curve. 
DL∆
DLaL*a ∆<∆
*
Lr
*La∆ Lr
 
The reason for an interior optimum is the following: Returning to Eq. (1), the value of specific 
capital is the probability of the customer staying ( )P  times the “face value” of this capital 
. In the loan decision, the non-interest profits (Z) constitute a fixed "revenue" 
for the bank in the sense of being predetermined and thereby not a function of the loan extended. 
All else equal, the bank can increase its expected present value by increasing P in either of two 
ways. If it increases ∆L, it eventually also reduces the net marginal interest earnings of the loan 
stock because  is a declining function of 
( )[ LrrZ L −+≡M ]
Lr L∆ due to credit risk (Eq. (5)). This reduces the 
marginal face value. Alternatively, it can cut . This reduces the net marginal interest earnings 
on the loan, which also reduces the marginal face value. Rationing is optimal if the product of 
the probability and the face value hits a maximum before ∆LD, the two effects offsetting each 
other at the margin. 
Lrˆ
 
Another illustration is provided in Figure 2, which determines a sufficient condition for the 
interior optimum. There,  is depicted on the vertical axis, andLrˆ/1 L∆  on the horizontal axis. In 
Equation (1), the interior optimum condition is 0=+ MdPPdM , requiring 0== dPdM . The 
“iso-face value” curve M  is a locus of points where M is constant. It is declining in a rationing 
equilibrium, as stated, since ( )LLrarrL ∂∂−− /~  is negative as , or the marginal 
revenue of loans: As just stated, the interior optimum calls for the marginal face value of specific 
capital being offset by marginal gain in 
LddM ∆/
P , or LP ∆∂∂ / .The iso- P  curves are the loci of the 
points where  is constant. Again, we have to take into account the fact that an increase in the 
size of the loan, in addition to increasing 
P
P  directly, also increases credit risk, which is a cost. 
So an increase in the loan rate to cover the risk as in Eq. (5), does not increase  but reduces Lr P . 
Thus the effect of L∆  on  is the net effect of the direct effect and the effect through the loan P
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rate, or . We limited ourselves to examining the case of a positive . In the Figure, the D D P  
curves are descending at a diminishing rate, and we have substituted D in the equation for their 
slope, restricting of course D to be constant. We have drawn these curves as lines to keep the 
Figure clearer. The initial optimum is at the tangency of the M and P  curves at , where the 
marginal rates of substitution between  and 
0Ω
Lrˆ/1 L∆  are equal in both functions. 
 
b. The Interior Optimum 
 
The expressions for ∆L* and  read:  *Lr
 
,
2
1
0
*
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −≤∆ L
D
N
a
L          (9) 
 
where 2
1
AaPN ±−≡  
 
 .
ˆ
422 ZD
r
PaPaA
L∂
∂−≡  
( LL rPPrNZDr ˆ///2* ∂∂−+−= )         (10) 
In an interior optimum equality holds in Eq. (9) and λ is zero. With D > 0, the second term in the 
expression for A is positive in the range 0 ≤ ∆L ≤ ∆LD, observing its sign, which implies that 
2
!
A  is greater than aP  in the expression for . Since we examine only cases where L is 
positive, the plus sign applies to 
N
2
1
A  in this expression. This extremum is a maximum if the term 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ]LLrarraLP ∂∂+−−∆∂∂ /~12/
22 / Ldd ∆π
[ L  is either negative, or if positive, dominated in the 
expression for . Moreover, the term involving  has to be dominated in the 
expression for . 
22 ˆ/ LrP ∂∂
22 ˆ/ Lrdd π
 
Proposition 1. It can be optimal for the bank to extend loans to a valuable customer at an interest 
rate loss. As can be seen from Eq. (10), ( )LL rPPLZrr ˆ//*/* ∂∂−−=−  is negative if the 
customer’s Z/L is high enough and the bank is not certain of keeping the customer’s 
business. (Note that  in Eq. (9).)7 The can be even smaller than the 
minimum indicated by the Equation, as long as the face value of specific capital is 
positive (implying ; see Eq. (1)), but then the bank is in a corner solution: 
If the bank thinks that total or partial rejection of the application leads to the loss of the 
DNL 2/* = Lr
LZrrL /−>−
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customer with high enough a probability. As seen, the critical variable is now the 
average, rather than marginal, rate of return on the customer relationship. The reason is 
again that the bank is concerned with the entire specific capital but makes decisions on 
individual loans. It can thus be optimal to make a loan at an expected loss, provided the 
value of specific capital is positive, and rejection of the application would lead to a loss 
of the capital with high enough a probability. 
 
It is easy to see that if Z = 0, the expression is positive: a customer not generating non-interest 
income has to pay a loan rate making (the expected future loan stock’s)  greater than r; If the 
customer has no loans outstanding or in prospect initially, the marginal loan earnings 
 have to exceed 
Lr
( LLrarR LML ∂∂−≡ /ˆ ) r  (see Eq. (7a)). 
 
Of course, the above observations also apply to loans that do not add to the expected long-run 
loan stock like seasonal loans, as can be seen from Eq. (9) by setting a = 0. 
 
The phenomenon that the bank is concerned with the entire specific capital but makes decisions 
on individual loan applications has another interesting implication, known to practical bankers. 
A potential or actual problem debtor can force the bank to choose between making one more 
risky loan with even a negative expected return in the hope of saving the entire specific 
capital , whereas by refusing the request the bank takes a high probability of 
losing much of the loan capital and all of the rest of specific capital. 
( L∆ )
]( )[ LrrZ L −+
 
Our explanation for the bank’s equilibrium is closest to that of Cukierman (1978), who 
determines the optimal loan stock with P = 1; ∂P/∂∆L = 0 in our notation. His service profits (the 
counterpart of dZ) are a continuous function of the loan stock. His optimum is an interior 
solution where, in our notation, [ ]dLrRLZ/ ML −+∂∂=0 . Therefore his marginal interest 
earnings plus the marginal service profits equal the marginal opportunity cost of funds. The 
source of the inequality between marginal interest earnings and the marginal opportunity cost of 
funds is then the marginal service profits, which have to be positive. 
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The ∆L* and  depend on , *Lr LP ∆∂∂ / LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ , and Z as follows. In Figure 1, an increase in 
∂P/∂∆L causes the R curve to shift up and become steeper for any given value of LaL ∆+0 , 
which leads to a decline in ∆L* and . In Figure 2, the partial of the expression for the slope of 
the 
*
Lr
P  curve with respect to LP ∆∂∂ /  is positive. Thus an increase in makes the LP ∆∂∂ / P  
curve flatter at , and the  curve intersects the ´1P
´
1P M curve at 0Ω . The bank can now move to a 
higher P  curve while keeping M constant by trading L∆  for along the Lrˆ/1 M curve, until it 
reaches a tangency of the curves at 1Ω . The reason for this somewhat surprising result is that 
first, the  curve becomes flatter because of the interdependence between P LP ∆∂∂ /  and 
 through , as explained: An increase in LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ D L∆  increases P  directly. It lowers it because 
the increase it causes in credit risk causes an increase in the loan rate, and we assumed the direct 
effect to dominate. Then the effect of LP ∆∂∂ /  through LrP ˆ/ ∂∂  cancels out its direct effect in 
the expression of the slope, only the effect of  remaining.8 It follows that if , the slope 
of the  curve remains unchanged.  
D 0=D
P
 
In other words, an increase in LP ∆∂∂ /  makes it optimal for the bank to increase P  to increase 
the value of specific capital. In the new situation it can do it by cutting the loan rate and the loan 
quantity. Namely, with a positive ( )ZrPD Lˆ/, ∂∂  has to dominate  in Eq. (9), which makes a 
cut in the loan rate more attractive, credit risk reducing the attractiveness of an increase in the 
loan size. 
*PL
 
Of course, if the bank is unable to change the loan rate, as is often the case with the best 
customers, an increase in  leads to an increase in LP ∆∂∂ / L∆ , since L∆  is now the only 
variable affecting P . See Appendix 2. 
 
An increase in LrP ˆ/ ∂∂  lowers the R curve and makes it flatter for any given value of L∆  in 
Figure 1. It also shifts up the C curve. This leads to an increase in *L∆ . The  curve shifts 
“down” towards the horizontal axis, reducing the value of  for any given value of 
*
Lr
*
Lr *0 LaL ∆+ . 
So  declines if the movement of the curve dominates the movement along the curve, and vice 
versa. In Figure 2, the derivative of the expression for the slope of the 
*
Lr
P  curve with respect to 
 is negative. So the LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ P  curve becomes steeper at , intersecting the '2P M  curve. Like 
above, it is now optimal to move to a tangency at 2Ω , with a larger L∆  and  according to the Lrˆ
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Figure, leading to a greater P  without sacrificing M . As we suggested, however, the change in 
the interest rate is actually ambiguous, because is not independent but  a function of Lrˆ L∆ , 
which Figure 2 does not fully take into account: the increase in L∆  causes the loan rate to rise 
(Eq. (5)), while the other effects cause it to decline, in accordance with Figure 1. The explanation 
is a mirror image of the above. 
 
An increase in non-interest profits ( )Z  leads to an upward shift of the C curve, causing the 
intercept of the curves to move out in Figure 1, which leads to an increase in the optimal loan. It 
makes the  curve shift “down” towards the horizontal axis so that the change in the loan rate 
depends on whether the movement of the   curve dominates the movement along it. The 
algebra shows, however, that the loan rate declines.9 In Figure 2, the 
Lr
Lr
M  curve shifts out (not 
shown) while the slope of the P  curve remains unchanged. The increase in the face value of 
specific capital makes it optimal to improve the customer’s loan terms. Therefore it is optimal to 
use both variables -- provided of course that the customer made its loyalty conditional on the 
loan ( 0/,0ˆ/ >∆∂∂<∂∂ LPrP L ). 
 
If the bank is unable to change the loan rate, an increase in Z leads to an increase in L∆ , since 
L∆ is now the only variable affecting P , as can be seen in Appendix 2.  
 
An increase in P shifts the C curve down and makes it steeper, which leads to a decrease in *L∆  
with D positive. The  curve shifts “up” away from the horizontal axis so that  increases if 
the movement of the curve dominates the movement along it, and vice versa. 
Lr
*
Lr
 
Proposition 2. A rationed customer can induce the bank to extend a larger loan by asking for less 
if its P function is concave enough with respect to L∆ . We obtain from Eq. (9), where 
equality holds, observing that  (Eq. (3)): LPLP D ∆∂−∂=∆∂∂ //
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( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ([ ) ]ZrPDPNrP
ZrPDPNLP
Ld
dr
LL
L
D
L
ˆ/22/ˆ/
ˆ/2//*
∂∂+∂∂
∂∂+∆∂∂=∆       (12) 
With D positive, the multiplicand of the first term in the brackets of Eq. (11) is positive, 
as shown in connection with Eq. (9), making that term positive. In the multiplicand of the 
second term, the minus sign applies to  and the plus sign to the second term if  . 
The first term of this expression equals  in Eq. (9), or . The multiplicand as 
a whole thus equals the last two terms of Eq. (8), and with it has to be negative for 
the equation to have positive real roots. The derivative is positive and the conventional 
result obtains if the first term in the brackets dominates, or the second term is positive, 
observing its sign: if  is positive. However, if  is negative and the 
second term dominates, the rationed customer - which by definition would like to have a 
bigger loan - can obtain a bigger loan by asking for less. 
aP 0>D
DPN 2/ *PL
0>D
22 / LP ∆∂∂ 22 / LP ∆∂∂
 
If such a customer reduced its request, the vertical part of its R curve in Figure 1 would move in. 
The curve would decline for any given value of LaL ∆+0  smaller than , as DLaL ∆+0
( )[ ]222 // LLPLddR D ∆∂∂−=∆  is positive when  is negative. The C curve would also 
decline, as  is positive. When the second term in Eq. (11) dominates, 
the R curve declines by more so that 
22 / LP ∆∂∂
([ LLPaLddC D ∆∂∂=∆ // ) ]
*L∆  increases. 
 
The  is negative because the multiplicand in the numerator of Eq. (12) is negative as 
the multiplicand of the second term in Eq. (11). Then the multiplicand in the denominator is also 
negative, making the denominator positive and the whole expression negative. So the  curve 
shifts “up” away from the horizontal axis, causing  to increase. Thus  and  both 
increase. The reason for this result is that by reducing the loan request the customer with a 
concave enough a 
D
L Lddr ∆/*
Lr
*
Lr
*L∆ *Lr
P  function reduces LP ∆∂∂ /  for any given value of L∆ , and a decline 
in  makes it optimal for the bank to satisfy more of the request at a higher loan rate, as 
shown above.10 
LP ∆∂∂ /
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As the customer continues to reduce DL∆ , these developments continue until a maximum ∆L* is 
reached. If this maximum is a corner solution at , the loan granted starts declining by 
the decline in the loan request thereafter. 
*
0
DLL ∆+
 
If the bank is unable to change the loan rate, the Proposition holds for a customer with convex 
enough a P function, as shown in Appendix 2. 
Proposition 3. The intermediate-to-large firm's mobility - through access to other banks and the 
open market - affects its optimal loan terms, adjusted for scale, unambiguously 
improving them if the bank cannot adjust the loan rate. However, the really large firm can 
also extract a greater share of the rents at the source. This worsens its loan terms. Let the 
firm expand in scale. Then also its optimal loan stock increases proportionately. 
However, the intermediate-to-large firm typically has lower switching costs than smaller 
firms, having established relations with several banks, and access to the open market, 
which gives it a higher LP ∆∂∂ / and LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ . As shown above, if D > 0, the increase in 
 lowers LP ∆∂∂ / *L∆  and , and the increase in *Lr LrP ˆ/ ∂∂  increases *L∆ , while its 
effect on  depends on whether the movement along the  curve dominates the 
movement of the curve. 
Lr Lr
 
However, the really large firm’s transactions and their commissions are often so large 
that it pays to negotiate them individually, which makes it possible for these firms to 
extract more of the rents already at the source. This reduces Z, which lowers the optimal 
loan quantity and increases the loan rate, strengthening the effects of LP ∆∂∂ / , and 
weakening the effects of LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ , on *L∆ . 
 
If the bank is unable to change the loan rate, the increase in LP ∆∂∂ /  increases L∆ , while a 
decline in Z reduces it. Thus banks’ unwillingness to lend to big firms at favorable rates, unless 
they make profits on them on services, is thus consistent with rationality in this model. 11 
 
These effects contrast with Blackwell and Santomero (1982), who find that the veteran or prime 
customer’s loans are the first to be rationed, because its loan demand function is more (interest) 
elastic and it is thus charged a lower loan rate. They assume that competition keeps Z at zero. Of 
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our key customer characteristics, LrP ˆ/ ∂∂ is closest to theirs, and we obtain an increase in L∆  in 
response to an increase in its absolute value, declining for any given Lr L∆ . An increase in 
 leads to a decline in LP ∆∂∂ / *L∆  and . The reason for the discrepancy is that our customer 
has a nonnegative Z and responds to unfavorable loan terms not by reducing its borrowing while 
staying on as a customer, but by considering taking all its business, both L and Z, elsewhere. 
*
Lr
 
Greenbaum et al. (1989) use a search-theoretic model and also find that the veteran customer’s 
loan terms are worse, because the customer’s profit function is convex and the variance of the 
cash flows declines with tenure. Our counterpart is the “loyal customer”, whose Z is greater and 
which gets better loan terms provided it makes its loyalty conditional on the loan. 
 
c. The Global Optimum 
 
We are now ready to examine the loan decision from a broader perspective. As proposed, in 
Figure 1, an increase in Z causes the C curve to shift up and the optimal loan to increase, while 
the  curve shifts “down”, causing the optimal loan rate to decline. As Z increases, the optimal 
loan increases up to the point where the interior solution calls for the whole request being 
granted: the intercept reaches the point where the R curve becomes vertical, the  curve shifting 
“down” towards the horizontal axis. The bank now ends up in a corner solution: it would be 
prepared to extend more loans if only the customer applied for more. It has an incentive to invite 
the customer to apply for more (i.e. to increase 
Lr
Lr
DL∆ ) only if the marginal revenue on loans, net 
of the risk premium, exceeds r. If the marginal revenue is smaller than r, the bank will not invite 
the customer to borrow more, since βπ =<∆∂∂ Pfor0/ L ; 0/ =∆∂∂ LP ; (Eq. (7a)), equality 
holding in Eq. (7c): The bank cannot increase the probability of the customer staying, and thus 
its specific capital, after the point where the customer got all it asked for. This property differs 
from that of Cukierman (1978): his service profits are a monotone function of the loan stock, 
which produces an interior solution. However, the optimal loan rate keeps declining according to 
Eq. (10) as Z increases. 
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There is a limit, however, to how far the loan rate can decline, because the interest rate cannot be 
negative. The prime rate convention may raise the floor still higher. When the floor is binding, 
the bank cannot cut the loan rate. It is then in the regime of Appendix 2. 
 
Correspondingly, a decline in Z leads to a downward shift of the C curve and an “upward” shift 
of the curve. The optimal loan rate begins to increase after  has exceeded the floor rate Lr
*
Lˆr Lrˆ . 
The optimal loan is unaffected by a change in Z or by changes in other variables affecting 
*L∆ as long as the customer is in a corner solution. After an interior solution has been reached, 
 begins to decline, doing so until the intercept of the C curve with the vertical axis coincides 
with the corresponding intercept of the R curve. From this point on, the entire application is 
rejected. Naturally, as proposed in connection with Proposition 1, a customer with a zero Z can 
get a loan only by paying a risk-adjusted interest rate (now or in the future) greater than r: it is 
optimal to make a loan only to a customer with a positive expected net present value to the bank. 
*L∆
 
The fact that the loan terms that the bank is willing to offer to the customer improve with Z and 
specific capital in general causes resources to be reallocated in favor of profitable customers' 
projects, by lowering both their probability of being rationed and often also their loan rate. 
Hence these customers face a lower opportunity cost of investment than less profitable 
customers, a point made by Cukierman (1978). This is problematic from the resource allocation 
point of view, since the size of a rational customer's deposits (whose profits to the bank are part 
of Z ) is a declining function of their opportunity cost, i.e. the marginal rate of return on its 
investments. The commission revenues, in turn, are a function of the customer's production 
function. A customer demanding plenty of inputs sold profitably by the bank is a profitable 
customer, whose investments are financed over a less profitable customer’s more profitable 
investments: customer profitability to the bank becomes a factor in resource allocation at the 
expense of the expected rate of return of the investment.12  
 
Proposition 4. The bank is not indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers, 
except by chance, and there is no mechanism bringing about indifference. Eqs. (7a)-(7c) 
imply for customers i and j: (∂π/∂∆L)i ≤ (∂π/∂∆L)j ≤ 0. Inequality holds if either or both 
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customers are in corner solutions, except by chance. Thus equality holds only if both 
customers are in interior solutions during the loan decision, i.e. (∂π/∂∆L)i,j = 0, except by 
chance. After the loan decision, some customers may leave, others staying. For those who 
stay in the bank’s set of customers, Pi rises to the customer-specific value of βi. Thus the 
marginal profits are characteristically different even for customers who were in an 
interior solution during the loan decision, except by chance, and there is no mechanism 
bringing about indifference. Thus the fact that banks have profitable and less profitable 
customers all the time, as observed by practical bankers, is consistent with optimality in 
our model. Moreover, since the valuable customers are on average those paying the 
lowest interest rates (Equation (10)), it is understandable why bank management would 
get upset about losing them rather than the customers paying the highest rates.  
 
Why will competition not depress the loan rate of good customers until the bank becomes 
indifferent, at the margin, about lending to each customer? First, loan rate floors may be binding, 
and if so, they typically apply to good customers’ loans. Naturally, outside banks are normally 
subject to the same floors. Competitive pressure from outside institutions is limited by the fact 
that much of the profits is rent on accumulated information capital, part of which is not 
transferable, being private. Of course, the incumbent bank has an incentive not to transfer 
information on a customer that is contemplating switching. At the very least, information makes 
the bank’s subjective probability distribution of the return on the customer’s investments more 
compact. This increases the expected loan earnings by reducing the probability of default, given 
that a prudent bank keeps the loan payments below the expected returns on the borrower’s 
investments. The incumbent bank (and the customer) knows therefore that it is the low cost 
provider of loans, mainly thanks to the information capital accumulated in the past. So as long as 
its offer is “reasonably competitive”, the customer, economizing on transaction costs, will not 
shop further, as suggested by practical bankers in the Introduction. Therefore, the customer 
normally does not even verify the competitiveness of the offer. It is also not optimal for the bank 
to invite the customer to borrow more, except if the marginal risk-adjusted revenue of loans 
exceeds r. Note that in the expressions for the optimal loan quantity and loan rate, all the 
arguments are customer-specific except for the market rate. Optimal bank behavior vis a vis 
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customers with respect to which the loan rate floor is a binding constraint is analyzed in 
Appendix 2.13 
 
A related observation is worth noting. It is optimal for the bank to extend loans to the customer 
as long as the customer’s specific capital for it is positive. The customer can increase its share of 
specific capital at the expense of the bank by making credible that its LP ∆∂∂ / , LrP ˆ/ ∂∂  are 
high, that is, the alternative to accommodation is likely to be the loss of the customer. In this 
situation, it is optimal for the bank to accommodate the customer as long as the bank has a 
marginal share of specific capital to itself. In this model, such a customer may thus get 
practically all the rents from the capital, because it, too, has bargaining power, in contract to 
Sharpe (1990). The reluctance of banks to lend to large customers at favorable rates, unless they 
get service revenue from them, as mentioned in the Introduction, suggests that a point of 
indifference has been reached with these customers.  
 
Proposition 5. Assume that the bank cannot change the loan rate e.g. because of an interest rate 
floor like the prime rate convention. Then the customer cannot reach its maximum 
obtainable loan stock in one try, except if it has convex enough a P function starting at 
the origin. Proof: Available from the author.  
 
3. Concluding Comments 
 
We have developed a model of bank lending behavior in the presence of customer-specific 
capital and the critical nature of the loan decision, which are mainly due to joint production in 
information and transactions.2 Therefore, if the profits are independent across customers, the 
bank maximizes the expected present value of its profits by maximizing the product of the 
probability of the customer staying with the bank (which is a function of the loan extended each 
time one is applied for) and the face value of the specific capital of each customer. Thus the bank 
is concerned with then entire specific capital but makes decisions on individual loan 
applications. 
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The bank's loan decision was shown to be asymmetrical. On the one hand there is the marginal 
gain in the probability of the customer staying times all of specific capital (i.e. a function of the 
increment), and on the other the expected net marginal interest cost of the average loan stock, 
which does not include non-interest profits (Z) and is zero if the loan is not expected to increase 
the long-run stock. The Z improves the customer’s loan terms, reallocating resources to 
profitable customers' projects. Customer profitability for the bank thus becomes a factor in the 
allocation of resources. Adjusted for customer size, it is often negatively correlated with the 
profitability of the customer’s investments or depends on the customer’s production function. Its 
relative significance increases, the smaller the loan and the shorter its maturity. The conventional 
optimum results in the special case where the non-interest profits on each customer are zero and 
the bank is sure of keeping their business - or it does not care e.g. because of perfectly 
competitive markets. 
 
It can be optimal to extend loans to a valuable customer at an interest rate loss. Cutting the loan 
rate is not always possible, however, partly because of the nonnegativity of the interest rate and 
the prime rate convention, which accentuates the role of specific capital. 
 
A rationed customer with concave enough a P function can get a bigger loan by asking for less. 
The following can also be shown. Suppose the bank cannot change the loan rate because of the 
above interest rate floors or ceilings. Then the customer cannot reach its maximum obtainable 
loan stock in one try except if it has convex enough a P function starting at the origin.  
 
The intermediate-to-large firm's mobility affects its loan terms, unambiguously improving them 
if the bank cannot adjust the loan rate. However, the really large firm can extract a greater share 
of the rents at the source, which worsens the terms. Loyalty increases a customer's value to the 
bank but improves the customer's loan terms only to the extent that the customer makes it 
conditional on the loan extended. 
 
There is no mechanism bringing about an equilibrium where the bank is indifferent, at the 
margin, between lending to different customers. The bank is in a corner solution with respect to 
its good customers, and other customers often have an incentive to try to get to a corner. 
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Therefore corner solutions may be the rule rather than the exception in bank-customer relations. 
The best customers are immune to monetary policy if they are in a corner solution and the 
interest rate floor is binding. They can thus get all the loans on preferential terms in all 
conceivable situations, as is well known to practical bankers.14 
 
On the whole, these findings suggest that the contribution of the banking system to the efficiency 
of resource allocation is likely to be smaller than has commonly been perceived. The allocative 
effect of information capital through the interest earnings on loans can be justified on efficiency 
grounds to the extent that it contributes to the appropriate pricing and rationing of loans. The 
same applies to banking services priced on the basis of risk. However, the allocative effects of 
non-interest earnings on loan terms are likely to be a source of serious inefficiency, which can be 
expected to persist into the future. The economies of joint production are substantial, and recent 
product innovations in banking services have enhanced the significance of specific capital on 
resource allocation, whereas the switch to cost-based pricing has weakened it. 
 
Another implication of specific capital is that there are efficiency gains to be made by allowing 
banks to further expand the scope of their operations to e.g. the investment banking and 
information business - although the profits of this business may have effects on loan terms 
similar to those of Z, which works in the opposite direction. 
 
Finally, the harsh judgment on banks’ lending to present problem debtors does not appear to be 
entirely justified when viewed in the light of the present approach. In offering loans to 
prospective customers on concessionary terms banks invest in specific capital. If non-interest 
earnings on the loans are taken into account in addition to net interest earnings and credit losses, 
the picture changes substantially: For example, Brazil was not a big net drain of funds but 
Citybank's second most profitable source of business in 1988, surpassed only by the United 
States (The Economist 1989, p. 69). Moreover, a potential or actual problem debtor can take 
advantage of the decision asymmetry when asking for a loan: it can force the bank to choose 
between making one more risky loan even with an expected loss in the hope of saving the entire 
specific capital, whereas by refusing the request the bank takes a high probability of losing much 
of the loan capital and all of the rest of specific capital. 
 26
 
The present approach is not limited to banking but can be applied to firms operating on most 
customer markets. 
 
The research agenda for the future points in several directions. Further empirical research is 
called for to quantify the relationships. Secondly, the bank-customer relationship is a repeated 
game with asymmetric information, where each party reveals to the other parts of its behavior 
function each round. Thus a game-theoretic study of the bank-customer relationship based on the 
present approach could provide interesting insights on the working of the monetary system. 
Finally, this approach may open interesting avenues in the theory of loan pricing and credit 
rationing in general. 
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1. I am not aware of studies on the joint production of information and banking services. That of 
deposits and loans has been studied on a general level by Adar, Agmon, and Orgler (1975). 
 
2. A reason for the important role of loans is economizing on transactions costs. The pricing 
decisions of the bank are made by costly executives, and it would be very costly to negotiate 
individually the prices of high-volume transactions involving small unit sums like deposit rates 
and commissions: they are typically posted prices. The terms on larger loans are typically 
negotiated and tailored individually in any case. It is thus efficient to make also other individual 
adjustments in loan terms, the bank having an incentive to share the rents on the relationship 
with the customer here, to keep the customer from abandoning its non-shopping attitude. 
 
3. The face value of the bank's specific capital is composed as follows: 
 
Mi ≡ Zi + rLi − r( )Li ≡ E Σt= 0
T
1/ 1+ i( )t[ ] zit + rLit − rt( )Lit[ ]⎧ ⎨ ⎩ ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ , 
 
where , and  is the net present value of the expected rents from 
services,  the bank's discount rate, 
( )qtqtqitnqit CRSz −Σ≡ =0 iZ
i T  its planning horizon, t  time, the number of 
transactions of type  made by customer i in period t, and and   their marginal revenue 
and marginal cost to the bank, respectively. It is seen that  is a function of the nature of the 
customer's business, given , , and i. Since specific capital is the expectation of the returns, 
it is optimal to give a loan to a new customer only if the relationship offers a positive expected 
net present value.  
qitS
q qtR qtC
iZ
qtR qtC
 
4. Note that P = pb, where the customer is expected to keep the share b of its business with the 
bank with probability p. Thus the specific capital is the same if the customer keeps all its current 
business (b = 1)  with the bank with probability p/2 as it is if it keeps a half of it (b = ½) with 
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probability p, all else equal. Then of course M is the face value of the customer’s total specific 
capital, which the bank does not know. 
 
5. Note, however, that  and  are the average interest rates on the entire loan stock in Eqs. (1) 
and (4). In the 
Lr Lrˆ
P  function, the loan rate is the rate on the loan in question L∆ , of which  is a 
function. Specifying 
Lrˆ
P  directly as a function of  means that the absolute value of  is 
greater than the partial with respect to the rate on 
Lrˆ LrP ˆ/ ∂∂
L∆ . 
 
6. Eq. (4) and the Equation for  in the Figure yield: Lr
 
dˆ r L = a ∂˜ r /∂L( )+ aZ/L2 − ∂P/∂∆L( )/ ∂P/∂ˆ r L( )[ ]d∆L+ dr, 
 
where the expression in the brackets is positive. Thus an increase in the loan size leads to an 
increase in the loan rate. 
 
7. The optimal marginal revenue on loans  can also be smaller than r, since it is smaller than 
: 
*
MLR
*
Lr ( ) */~** LLrarR LML ∂∂−= . 
 
8. The optimality condition reads: 
 
( ) ( ) .0ˆ/2//1// 2121 <
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ∂∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∆∂∂∆ ZrPDAaPPDALPdLd L  
 
9. We have: 
 
( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ∂∂±
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ZrPDAaPPANaDdZrd LL ˆ/2//4/ˆ 2
1
2
1
22* m  
 
The minus sign applies for  and the plus sign for aP ( )ZrP Lˆ/ ∂∂ . With a positive , Equation 
(8) has positive real roots if its last two terms add up to a negative number (  in Figure 1). 
This implies 
D
0>C
*ˆ/ PLZrP L >∂∂ . Therefore the multiplicand is negative, making the whole 
expression negative. 
 
10. Note that the R curve is still likely to be convex due to . Moreover, P in Eq. (4) is a 
function of the part of the application not granted 
2L
DLL ∆−∆ . For example, β=P  both at the 
new lower value of  and at the old value, and it equals DL∆ κ  at 0=∆L  in both cases. Likewise, 
the  are equal at the new and the old values of , where LP ∆∂∂ / ε−∆ DL ε  is small. 
 
11. An implication is that multiple banking relationships are rational for the customer if their 
effects on dominate those of Z, net of the LP ∆∂∂ / customer’s share of investment costs. Another 
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implication is that loyalty increases the customer’s value to the bank, since the bank can expect 
to get the revenues longer into the future, which increases M (note 4). However, loyalty 
improves the customer’s loan prospects only to the extent that the customer makes it conditional 
on the loan extended (  when 0// ** ==∂∆ dZdrZLd L 1=P ; 0ˆ// =∂∂=∆∂∂ LrPLP , as can be 
inferred from the discussion above). 
 
12. Of course, the profitability of the customer’s projects can affect the bank’s loan decision 
indirectly through  if it affects the customer’s assessed credit risk or its willingness to pay 
interest, and possibly through Z if it affects its demand for bank services, but these are second-
order effects. 
Lr
 
13. The reader can see that monetary tightening increases r , which reduces  in the rrL −ˆ P  
function (Eq. (4)), and the net interest earnings on loans rrL −  in Eq. (1). The customer in a 
corner is unaffected by monetary conditions if also the loan rate ceiling or floor is binding. 
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Appendix 1. The Bank's Subjective Probability Function 
 
Let the customer’s profit be: ( ) LrLEr LK ˆ−+=π , where  is the average rate of return on the customer’s 
capital consisting of its loan stock plus its equity E. Maximizing profit yields: , where  is the 
marginal rate of return on the customer’s capital and 
Kr
LK rr ˆ
' −=λ 'Kr
λ  the Langrangean of the loan stock constraint. A necessary 
condition for the customer to switch to another bank is the condition for the customer to engage in search, i.e. that 
the present value of its expected future profits increases by more than the sum of the search costs (s) and its risk 
premium γ: in case of search, s is a sunk cost and has to be borne even if the search leads to the conclusion that 
switching is not optimal. We have: 
 
rK
' − E ˆ rLA( )[ ]E LA( )− rK' − E ˆ rL( )[ ]E L( )> s + γ ,      (A1) 
 
where ( )ALrE ˆ and ( )ALE are the expected loan rate and loan stock with the other bank, respectively. The 
customer's E(L) is based on the information it obtains from the bank: the bank's responses to its given loan requests ( )DL∆ . If the customer is not rationed and DLL ∆=∆ , ( )LE can be expected to remain the same or increase. If 
he is rationed and , the customer may revise DLL ∆<∆ ( )LE downward, which increases the left hand side of Eq. 
(A1), given ( )ALE  and ( )ALrE ˆ . The customer starts searching if the new value of that side exceeds s + γ. The 
customer then forms a better informed opinion of ( )ALE  and ( )ALrE ˆ  on the basis of the values of  and  
that the best alternative bank offered in response to 
AL∆ ALrˆ
DL∆ , and switches if the left-hand side of Eq. (A1) is positive. 
Given this, it is rational for the old bank to expect the probability of the customer staying with it to be a rising 
function of and a declining function of , given DLL ∆−∆ Lrˆ ( )ALE , ( )ALrE ˆ , s, and γ, where we proxy ( )ALrE ˆ  
by the free market rate (plus a margin). This yields Equation (3) in the text. 
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Appendix 2. The Optimum Loan When the Bank Cannot Change the Loan Rate  
 
When the nonnegativity or prime rate (or loan rate ceiling) constraint is binding, the loan rate is the floor or ceiling 
rate Lrˆ , which translates into the interest earnings of Lr  via Eq. (5). In this regime, the bank can increase P only by 
increasing L∆  so that an incentive to invest in P always translates into an increase in L∆ , except in a corner 
solution.  Eq. (7a) yields: 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∂∂+−∆∂∂
−+∆∂∂≤∆ 0* /~/
/1 L
LraPrrLP
rraPZLP
a
L
L
L      (B1) 
If inequality holds in Eq. (7c) and rationing is optimal, equality holds in Eq. (B1). Correspondingly, if equality 
holds in Eq. (7c), inequality holds in Eq. (B1) and we have a corner solution. 
 
The propositions are affected as follows. Proposition 1 holds on conditions analogous to those of the general case. 
 
Proposition 2 holds for a customer with a convex enough P function: 
 
( ) 222
22*
/
~
Grr
L
rZ
L
PP
L
P
Ld
Ld
LD ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+∂
∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
∆∂
∂−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∆∂
∂=∆
∆
  ,    (B2) 
where G  is the denominator of Eq. (B1). The denominator of Eq. (B2) is of course positive. In the numerator, the 
second factor is positive since its both terms are positive. The first factor and the derivative are positive if the P 
function is concave ( )0/ 22 ≤∆∂∂ LP , or if convex, if the first term dominates. Then the conventional result is 
obtained: the loan extended increases with the loan request. However, if the P function is convex 
( )0/ ∆∂ 22 >∂ LP  (rather than concave, as in the general case) and the second term dominates in the first factor, 
the loan extended increases when the loan request is reduced. As the customer reduces the loan request, LP ∆∂∂ /  
increases for any given value of , and DLL ∆≤∆ *L∆  increases. It is optimal for the customer to reduce the 
request until either Eq. (B2) changes sign, or the customer reaches a corner solution. In the latter case, it is optimal 
for the customer to try to avoid an interior solution and try to stay in a corner solution.  
 
Proposition 5: Proof available from the author. 
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Table 1. Small Business Bank Shopping in Canada 
 
 
 
 
   Percentage of Application Extended 
 
        < 50 50-99  100 
 
    
Percentage of   
applicants                          60               55                   35 
shopping 
 
 
 
If 47 % of 
shoppers 
switch,          28                26                   16 
percentage 
of applicants 
switching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hines, George, A., Allan Riding, and Roland Thomas. “Small Business 
  Bank Shopping in Canada”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 1991, 
  1045-1056. 
 35
 
R,C 
L0 L0 + a∆L* 
r  
C 
 
R 
L0 + a∆LD 0L
2
~ PrP ⎞⎛ ∂∂∂
Lr  
*
1Lr  
Lr
Fig
     ( )0ˆ LaLrLaLR L ∆+⎟⎟⎠⎜⎜⎝ ∂∂+∆∂≡
⎤⎡ ⎞⎛∂P λ ( )⎥⎦⎢⎣ ∆++⎟⎠⎜⎝ +∂−≡ LaLPaZraC L 0ˆ
PZL
L rP
r
LaL
r
ˆ/0 ∂∂
−+∆+−=
ure 1. Determination of the Optima
          Rate When D > 0. l Loan and Loan  
 36
  
 
  
 
                 
 
 
Lrˆ
1
1Ω  
1P
0Ω
'
1P
 
2Ω
P
'
2P M  
 
 
Figure 2. The Bank’s Interior Equilibrium 
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